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Executive summary 
In Hungary, less than two-thirds of the population between the age of 40 and 
the retirement age are in full-time employment. The overwhelming majority of the 
remaining one third are pensioners without any labour income. The employment of 
middle-aged people would improve the potential of the economy in two respects: 
employees produce value and pay taxes, and they do not represent a drain on the 
pension fund. Thus, in the longer term, this may also help to reduce the contributions 
payable from labour income. 
It is primarily the exceedingly liberal regulations that promote early 
retirement. Until 2002, the retirement age increase of 1997 had scarcely any effect, 
because, having accumulated sufficient years of service, the vast majority of 
pensioners were able to retire at the previous retirement age. The disability pension 
offers yet another route finally to exit the labour market. 
This paper looks at pensioners who are below the cut-off age of eligibility for 
old-age pension that came into effect in 1997, but who are over 40 years of age, based 
on the 1993–2001 Household Budget Survey (HBS) of the Central Statistical Office 
(CSO). 
The majority of people taking early retirement are in work immediately prior 
to their retirement; significantly fewer people are unemployed. Looking at 
households over time we find that, after retirement, the personal income of the 
people affected drops by no more than 25 per cent, and the per capita household 
income by no more than 13 per cent on average. In the case of unemployed people, 
retirement often brings about no change in their income. This is because, even 
though pensions fall a good way short of the previous gross earnings, the net income 
declines significantly less than the gross income due to the absence of taxation. 
Having examined the magnitude of incomes directly and indirectly, through 
the structure of expenditure, we find no significant decline or increase. This appears 
to indicate that grey or black employment is infrequent among pensioners below the 
official retirement age. 
One of the key factors in determining early retirement, apart from personal 
circumstances, is size of salary and the amount of the pension expected on the basis 
of that salary. This indicates that retirement is substantially influenced not only by 
the decreased demand for the elderly on the labour market, but also by individual 
motivations. 
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1. Introduction 
In the aging developed world, the economic activity of the middle-aged is an 
outstandingly important issue for government policies. Middle-aged people in 
employment create value and pay taxes; they also do not tap into the pension fund 
too early and, ideally, they make less use of the health services. All these factors 
motivated the EU recommendations made in Lisbon in 2000 that, inter alia, a 
significantly higher proportion of the elderly should be employed than is now the 
case. Compared to other countries, Hungary’s position is none too favourable: a large 
number of the middle-aged do not work, even if they are below the legal retirement 
age – they find various ways out of the labour market. Naturally, there are good 
reasons for this: a high proportion of the elderly have obsolete or obsolescent 
knowledge, or are less adaptable, and businesses competing on the international 
market have little interest in employing them. 
It is a well-known fact that in Hungary today, despite the relatively low 
unemployment rate, employment is also relatively low by European standards: only 
59 per cent of the 15 to 64-year-old population is employed, whereas the EU average 
is some 10 percentage points higher; the rate is especially low among the cohort aged 
between 40 and 60.1 This suggests that, in addition to uneducated young people and 
the young women who are not working for other reasons, we can, or should, expect 
the activation of the population aged between 40 years and the retirement age to 
contribute significantly to the convergence of our employment rates to the EU 
average. 
Before we can take appropriate measures to increase the activity of the 
middle-aged population, we must be aware of the reasons why they become inactive. 
As a major change is called for, it would be good if people who would otherwise 
retire as early as possible were motivated by market forces, rather than merely 
administrative measures compelling them to work until a later stage in their lives.2 
These measures must be efficient enough to increase participation, yet selective 
enough not to capture those who really are unable to work, rather than the work-shy. 
Moreover, by obtaining more accurate information on such behaviour, we can more 
accurately calculate the impact of the required measures on government expenditure. 
A simple calculation will indicate the volumes at issue.3 In 2001, there were 
some 830 thousand pensioners below the legal retirement age – a figure boosted that 
                                                 
1 This ratio is not improved significantly, even if we take into consideration that a far from negligible 
part of the age cohort generally used for the sake of international comparison (primarily women) are 
over the legal retirement age. 
2  It should be noted, however, that the continuous raising of the retirement age has not been 
accompanied by any major uproar, while the raw data of the CSO labour force survey indicate that it 
increased employment in the years concerned. Nevertheless, the compulsory and extensive raising of 
the retirement age obviously has its limitations, governed primarily by deterioration of health. 
3 The calculation was based on Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in the Munkaerőpiaci tükör (2004), Figure 5 in Scharle 
(2003) and the CSO Household Budget Survey (see explanation in Section 2). The amounts are in year 
2003 Forints. The correctness of the calculation assumes that the people removed from pensioner 
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year by 60 thousand disabled people and over 30 thousand old-age pensioners, or a 
total of 90 thousand people. Prior to their retirement, they had earned HUF 860 
thousand a year on average; after retirement, they received a pension of roughly 
HUF 420 thousand, and the overwhelming majority of them no longer worked. This 
represents an aggregate of HUF 77 billion in lost income (gross earnings) (plus the 
associated social insurance contributions), and entails some HUF 38 billion of 
pension outlay. Even though these figures were obtained by considering the entire 
age cohort below retirement age, it may not be unrealistic to expect adequate 
regulations and employment policy to halve the influx of disability pensioners, and 
to increase by several years the effective age for old-age retirement. The annual gain 
from these two factors (in the case of the latter, with only a one-year rise in the active 
age) would be approximately HUF 38 billion each – over HUF 75 billion in total per 
annum. This is the sum of gross earnings forgone and pensions unpaid; naturally, the 
additional contributions and tax revenues arising from employment, and the extra 
consumption arising from higher incomes, should be added, and the cost of benefits 
to people who would potentially become unemployed should be deducted. If none of 
the people who would otherwise retire were to join the unemployed, the 
employment rate would increase by about one percentage point. 
2. Activity of middle-aged people 
 2.1 Career activity  
The time series of activity trends for the entire population and for various 
qualification and age groups are known relatively accurately (see, for example, 
Munkaerőpiaci tükör, 2004; Lelkes and Scharle, 2004). These indicate that activity and 
age are in a typical correlation, described in detail in Figure 1. This depicts, 
separately for men and for women, the ratios of employed, unemployed, disability 
and old-age pensioners, people on parental leave and with other status, for various 
age groups in 2001. 
                                                                                                                                                        
status in the recommended manner retain their previous job opportunities or are able to find 
comparable jobs, rather than being moved into some other welfare scheme. 
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Fig. 1. Economic activity status in the various age cohorts, in 2001 
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Source: CSO Labour Force Survey, 2001/Q1. 
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Apart from the fact that young women tend to stay at home with their 
children more often, and have ‘other’ status more often than men do in all age 
cohorts, the ratio of the employed and pensioners appears very similar for the two 
sexes until approximately the age of 45. Over that age, employment declines steadily, 
the entire loss being accounted for by the increased proportion of disability 
pensioners. One important difference is that more women of 40 years and above are 
active than men in the same age groups. The situation changes radically as we 
approach the old-age retirement age. The number of old-age pensioners increases 
steeply at the age eligible for early retirement (60 for men, 55 for women), and 
reaches close to 100 per cent eight to 10 age years later.4 In this respect, there is no 
significant difference between men and women. Thus it appears that practically no 
one works after the retirement age, while in the preceding period the intensive 
decline in participation is attributable either to the extremely steeply deteriorating 
health of the population, or to the fact that an ever increasing number of people 
started to use disability pensioner status for ‘even earlier’ retirement. Even though 
widespread resentment may be caused by the assumption that it is the unfavourable 
labour market opportunities rather than health that is the motivation for taking 
disability pensioner status, Lelkes and Scharle (2004) does support that notion. The 
relatively high proportion of the ‘other’ status is also worth noting. This is easier to 
explain in the case of women, because we know that being a ‘full-time’ homemaker is 
more common among them. In the case of men, and also of women not active in the 
household, this category encompasses a highly heterogeneous group of people, 
ranging from the unemployed who are not inactive but are not looking for work, 
through erroneous responses, to people taking employment very infrequently and 
irregularly.  
2.2. Participation in international comparison 
It remains a question, however, whether the phenomena described above 
should be regarded as Hungarian peculiarities, or whether they result from the 
population and the more or less similar global economic environment. To facilitate 
comparison, Figure 2 shows the participation rates of two European countries in a 
graph similar to the one used above. 
The United Kingdom has a considerably more advanced economy than 
Hungary, but in the 1980s its industrial structure underwent a similar transformation 
to that seen in Hungary; this resulted in a very high number of poorly qualified 
                                                 
4 Despite the continuous raising of the retirement age since 1997 (in 2001, 62 for men, 58 for women), 
with sufficient length of service it is possible to retire with full pension at the previous earliest 
retirement age, i.e. at 60 and 55, respectively. The data disclosed in the study of the National Pension 
Insurance Directorate General appear to indicate that the overwhelming majority of the population 
had the required years of service, as some 95 per cent of all old-age pension awards were made before 
the legal retirement age (ONYF, 2004). The different increase in the proportion of pensioners indicated 
in Figure 1 is partly attributable to the difference in the years of service. 
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people left without jobs (see, for example, the report in Faggio and Nickell, 2003). 
The Netherlands did not suffer similar shocks, but it has a high level of social 
benefits. 
Fig. 2. Status of economic activity in the various age cohorts in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands, in 2001 (men only) 
United Kingdom 
 
 
 
The Netherlands 
 
 
Source: Presentation by Richard Blundell: ‘Pension incentives and the pattern of retirement’, 
2002. 
 
The retirement age is noticeably higher in both countries than in Hungary: the 
ratio of old-age pensioners rises steeply at the age of 65. This rise is faster than in 
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Hungary, but the ratio eventually flattens out at a similar rate of 90 per cent. Also 
importantly, in both countries there is a five-year period before the specified 
retirement age, when retirement is possible if certain conditions are fulfilled. As 
regards disability pensioner status – the most important channel for early retirement 
– all three countries are in a similar position: the ratio of disabled people starts rising 
steeply at the age of 40–50, and is followed by a decline from the c. 35 per cent level 
once old-age pension eligibility is reached. The absolute figures underlying the 
similar trends are very different: in the UK and the Netherlands, 10 per cent of 50-
year-old men are disability pensioners, while in Hungary the corresponding ratio is 
20 per cent. However, the difference is far less marked if we calculate the time 
backwards from the retirement age; that is, if we compare 50-year-old men in Hungary 
with 55-year-old men in the UK or the Netherlands. Thus the situation is 
fundamentally similar in all three countries – the differences in employment are 
attributable primarily to the retirement age, the other regulations affecting the 
effective retirement age (UK), and the low unemployment rate (Netherlands).    
Apparently, if the effective retirement age in Hungary were to reach the EU-15 
level, some of the employment problems would disappear. This would mean raising 
the formal retirement age to 65 years or more, and the removal of benefits that allow 
the current very early retirement. Naturally, such measures can only succeed if 
people, adapting to the changing conditions, are able to find jobs; or, put another 
way, only if employers are able to provide jobs for the population that is currently 
withdrawing en masse from the labour market. Since we have little understanding of 
such issues, due largely to the extreme difficulties involved in studying them, let us 
turn our attention to the issue of activity before retirement. 
We have focused mostly on the large-scale inactivity of the early elderly years; 
in order to filter out the potentially different effect mechanisms (see later), we have 
only looked at the population over 40. Considering that, on the one hand, the 
retirement age increase took effect only in 1998, and on the other hand, the effective 
retirement age remained very low even afterwards (and its volatility is affected by 
the years of service, on which we have no specific information), it is worth delimiting 
the age from the top end as well. To be on the safe side, we have selected as the limit 
the 2nd year before the retirement age effective in 1997, i.e. 58 for men and 53 for 
women. As another, seemingly ad hoc limitation of the population, we have left 
single-person households out of the analysis, which results in the loss of almost 15 
per cent of the sample. We took that decision because we are going to examine the 
change in the entire environment affecting individuals, i.e. the household, and in that 
respect single people are difficult to compare with those living with a partner. Even 
though single people are more frequently inactive or unemployed than the average, 
so far as other individual characteristics relevant for our purposes are concerned, 
they appear to be little different from their peers living within a family. Finally, it 
would have been useful to treat men and women separately, because their actions 
may be governed by different motivations, but this was not possible because of the 
low number of observations. Thus, below we consider the age group 40–58 for men 
and 40–53 for women who live in families. 
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2.3 Forms of activity and their transition 
Before attempting to explain the movements between the various forms of 
activity, we must undertake an overview of the frequency of the various statuses and 
the flows between them. The primary source of data relating to economic activity is 
the Labour Force Survey of the CSO, but as the analyses to be described later rely on 
the CSO Household Budget Survey (HBS), we will also use that data source for this 
purpose. Its advantages and disadvantages are described in detail in Section 2, and 
the terms used below are also defined there.  
Table 2. Flows between categories of activity (in t=3) according to categories of the previous 
period (t=1), for middle-aged people living with a partner, in two age groups between 25 
and the retirement age (per cent)  
 Activity in t=3 
Activity in t=1 Employed Unemployed Pensioner Other inactive Total Together 
Between 40 yrs. 
and retirement 
age 
      
Employed 86 5 8 1 100 64 
Unemployed 40 28 26 6 100 10 
Pensioner 5 0 94 1 100 20 
Other inactive 24 7 22 47 100 6 
Together 61 7 28 4 100 100 
Between 25 yrs. 
and 40 yrs. 
      
Employed 89 6 1 4 100 64 
Unemployed 46 35 4 15 100 14 
Pensioner 15 2 82 1 100 4 
Other inactive 31 10 3 56 100 18 
Together 70 11 5 15 100 100 
Source: own calculations based on the relevant periods of the HBS pooled panel (see data 
description in Section 2).  
 
Table 2 reveals the proportion of members of the observed group moving 
from one activity category5 into another between two periods one year apart (t=1 and 
t=3). As well the flows for the group above 40 but below retirement age, we also 
present the flows for the population below 40, by way of comparison. 
The pattern for the over-45 age group is characteristically different from the 
pattern for the younger group (as also indicated in Figure 1), not only in the 
distribution of activity, but also in the probability of transfer between activity 
                                                 
5 It is important to note about the categories used that the ‘pensioner’ transfer-status is included 
among the activity statuses. These pensioners are more correctly inactive people who receive a 
pension, and have only negligible other income. On the other hand, we find pension recipients among 
the employed: in their case, labour income is the decisive element. 
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categories. Unemployment is higher in the younger group, even though the 
likelihood of job loss is similar. The reason for this lies in the ways people move out 
of unemployment. While, for young people, the way out (apart from returning to the 
labour market or continued unemployment) is mostly inactivity, for the older group 
retirement is an available ‘solution’.6 Roughly one third of the elderly unemployed 
become pensioners, as opposed to approximately four per cent for the young; in the 
case of people in employment, the corresponding figures are eight per cent and one 
per cent, respectively. This directly shows the significance of retirement in 
‘addressing’ labour market difficulties by opening a way out of that market. 
2.4 The subject of the study 
Our information concerning the reasons underlying early retirement comes 
primarily from studies that rely on the data of the Central Statistical Office Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), which concentrates on individual behaviour (see, for example, 
Lelkes and Scharle, 2004). This survey, using a very large sample, collects 
information about each member of the household, but focuses on the labour market 
status of people, and thus the range of available data represents a significant 
constraint on the phenomena that can be examined. As we shall see, in addition to 
the labour market characteristics in the narrow sense, detailed knowledge of the 
individual’s environment also offers important clues as to how to reduce inactivity. 
This may facilitate the identification of causes (e.g. illness prior to the change) 
underlying exit from the labour market, as well as the detection of phenomena that 
indirectly signal the financial and labour market strategy pursued by the person who 
has become inactive and by his family (such as the size or structure of expenditure). 
This paper hopes to supplement our current knowledge in this respect. To this end, it 
estimates a more comprehensive model than the one used earlier, relying on a panel 
version of the CSO Household Budget Survey (HBS), which has such information in 
abundance. 
In the study, we set out to answer three questions: 
1. Whether the financial management of the inactive person or his family exhibits 
any attempts to respond to the altered income level, and thus to alleviate 
difficulties. If retirement brings about considerable financial loss from the prior 
situation, and the labour market offers possibilities for its alleviation, we ought to 
witness an increase in alternative income or a reduction in expenditure. 
2. As indicated above (and by other studies), the chances of elderly people finding 
formal employment are not good. It remains to be seen, however, whether those 
in early retirement are effectively inactive. Is it not possible that formal inactivity 
                                                 
6 The ‘other inactive’ category includes women rearing their children in the home, thus the rate of 
transfer from unemployment is very different for the two sexes. Unemployed men very often remain 
unemployed. Naturally it is not evident that women going from unemployment status into rearing 
children are trying to escape from the labour market. Even though we have practically no information 
about this issue, it is suggested by everyday experience. 
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is accompanied by informal work? We can attempt to answer that question by 
examining the correspondence between expenditure and income data. 
3. The third question relates to the relationship between individual characteristics 
and early retirement. In that context, it is important what effects the personal 
characteristics of the individual, the behaviour of his partner, and the 
circumstances of the household have on his retirement decision. However, the 
financial incentives that dominate the financial side of the decision play an 
outstanding role, because these can be most directly influenced by government 
measures. Using figures on actual salaries and pensions, we shall attempt to 
quantify the effect of such measures on the probability of retirement. 
2.5 Important factors not discussed 
The aforementioned objectives serve to answer one question: what 
instruments could be used to increase the employment of the elderly? However, the 
proposed approach does have some important constraints that must be taken into 
consideration: 
 The analysis relies on the HBS data files from between 1993 and 2001. 
Accordingly, it can reflect the impacts of the retirement age rise, implemented 
slowly but steadily after 1997, only to a limited extent, if at all. All we know about 
the outcome of the retirement age rise is that, on the one hand, it substantially 
increased employment among the age group directly affected (raw data of the CSO 
Labour Force Survey), and on the other hand, as retirement at the previous 
retirement age continued to be possible if sufficient years of service had been 
accumulated, a new selection mechanism was triggered. However, as we are going 
to look at early retirement, those factors will hopefully have no significant effect on 
our results. 
 Even though child-bearing has little part to play in the age group examined, its 
indirect effect on employment is far from negligible. Firstly, as our data indicate, the 
partner of an average 50-year-old man is 46 years old, and even though this varies 
between 34 and 60, most are aged between 42 and 50. Even though women are 
having their first and last children at an increasingly late age, in the relevant age 
cohort only a small proportion of the women are out of work because they are at 
home with their own infants or small children. We would need a completely 
different approach and data to evaluate the activities of the women rearing their 
children or helping out with their grandchildren: whether they should be regarded 
as a reserve labour force or as domestic producers of a child care service that could 
be obtained on the market.7 Even though we are aware of the presence of children in 
the household, and use such information, we know nothing about help provided to 
relatives living elsewhere, which may distort our results. For this reason, we are 
                                                 
7 The in-depth analyses of the Central Statistical Office’s ‘Time balance’ Surveys may contribute to that 
substantially. One of the first studies is that of the Nonprofit Munkacsoport on the labour reserves of 
the population, the summary of which has been published recently. The entire study is not yet 
available. 
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unable to discuss the switch between the work of women in the household and in 
the market. 
 Though general household surveys provide indirect information concerning 
health, there is an issue here of effects that can be observed with very low accuracy, 
if at all. In surveys documenting in detail economic activity and financial conditions, 
the details of health status are not known, with the possible exception of one or two 
main factors. However, specialised surveys indicate that, in general, disability 
retirement goes hand in hand with a significant deterioration in health. In his paper 
Kovács (2004) examines, using various approaches, the scores generated by the 
question asked in the panel survey of the CSO Demographic Research Institute’s 
‘Életünk fordulópontjai’ [‘Turning points in our life course’] about the health of the 
respondents. In his Table 2/21, he discloses the differences between the health 
assessments of the people on disability pension and other pensions, by age cohort. In 
the case of the 45–55 age group, these values are 3.86 and 5.48; in the 55–65 age 
cohort 4.23 and 6.32, respectively. The author concludes:  
“There is a huge difference in the health assessment of those starting their pensionable 
life as disability pensioners and those retiring as something else, to the detriment of the 
latter. Thus, in that respect, the whole system of disability pensions can be regarded as 
equitable.”  
Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that, even though some of the 
disability pensioners do abuse their position, the continuous and large-scale inflow 
into that group is attributable to the large proportion of employees suffering severe 
health impairments. There are convincing arguments that the report on the 
individual’s own health status is a very good approximation of the actual working 
capacity. However, the same study contains an important result on the assistance 
given and received by those with incapacitating health impairments. Accordingly: 
“…assistance provided in the form of cash or labour is significantly lower only in the 
case of the 45 and over group. However, apparently the provision of in-kind assistance 
is not hindered by incapacitating health impairments. The proportion of those who 
provide assistance among sufferers from such illnesses is close to the average and, 
indeed, in certain age groups is even higher.” 
This latter statement appears to indicate that there are useful activities that 
even sufferers from such severe ailments would be able to perform, but the available 
capacity is not used in the market because of the size and structure of the labour 
demand or the additional benefit offered by the family activity.  
2.6 The data used 
This study relies on the CSO Household Budget Survey (HBS). Since 1993 the 
survey has annually recorded the data of approximately 10 thousand households and 
their members. Though it is intended primarily to assess the expenditure of 
households, it also contains a wealth of other useful information. For instance, we 
have detailed information about the demographic and key market labour 
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characteristics of the entire household, and the incomes of the various individuals, 
including the income/consumption arising from own production. 
The expenditure data are based on a journal kept by the household member 
most familiar with financial matters for one month, indicating the volume (if 
applicable) and price of the goods purchased or produced. A year-end survey is also 
made of the consumption of durable goods, and the final expenditure figure is 
derived by combining the two figures. Incomes are assessed in a similar manner – 
monthly, then once a year. The annual assessment of income is not conducted at year 
end, though, but before the deadline for tax filing, when all sources of income, rather 
than only one part, are considered. Unless there is a contradiction, the whole-year, 
rather than the monthly, figure is considered to be definitive. In the case of the HBS, 
as in all similar surveys, income and expenditure can only be measured with a 
margin of error. Even so, in both areas the intention is that the survey should be 
comprehensive.8 
As only one third of the entire sample is replaced each year within the HBS, 
each household is covered by the survey for three years (except for drop-outs). In 
practice, this means that in the periods of 1993–1995, 1996–1998 and 1999–2001 the 
data of the various households and, unless the composition of the households has 
changed, of their members can be connected into three separate but identically 
structured panel databases. 9  Incidences of uninhabited apartments and failed 
collection attempts mean the sample cannot be representative of the entire 
population without weighting, and so the CSO weights it across the cross-section. As 
the panel exhibits diverse reasons for dropping out, we have used the weights 
documented by Kapitány and Molnár (2001). The partial refusals to answer 
necessitate a further technical restriction of the sample. These refusals tend not to 
render the observation completely useless, but they do often relate to important and 
sensitive information, such as income. Therefore we have left such households out of 
the analysis. 
It is very important that we can observe every person three times. This gives 
us the chance to grasp, to some extent, the changes in status over time and the trend 
of their features, and previous or subsequent characteristics can be used in the 
analyses. Furthermore, we can also address the issue that generally we do not know 
how long an individual stays in a certain status, and can normally only observe the 
size of his income. Therefore we have used the panel version of the HBS for the 
analysis, even though it entails a significant drop in the number of observations. 
As the number of observations in the various panels is not too large, we have 
analysed them together, rather than separately. This may be regarded as an extension 
of the so-called pooled cross-section analysis method. Accordingly, the first, second 
and third parts of each panel are treated identically, merged in the corresponding 
                                                 
8 For the sake of completeness, the CSO staff compile household-level balances, for control purposes, 
from income and expenditure. 
9 The availability of the data in panel form is attributable to the unstinting work of György Molnár, 
researcher of the MTA Economics Institute. The weight applicable to the panel is also available as a 
result of Molnár’s efforts, for which I owe him a debt of gratitude. 
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period of the new, pooled panel. However, as in the case of the pooled cross-section, 
it is necessary to address the effect of the ‘forgotten’ historical time. We do this by 
inflating the cash variables to a common point in time, and, for regression analyses, 
by including the appropriate control variables and indicators to denote the historical 
time. One of the former is the macro-regional level participation rate, which we 
calculate from the CSO Labour Force Survey. 
3. Theoretical framework 
The personal debate on whether to retire can have two outcomes: to retire or 
not to retire. The decision is governed partly by the utility offered by the two statuses, 
and partly by other factors. Such factors may include health, or even the opportunity 
the individual has to obtain supplementary income as a pensioner, potentially in the 
grey economy. As we can make only indirect inferences about the latter, we have 
described the model of the retirement decision without that option. We have also 
made the assumption that, given certain characteristics, this is a real decision, rather 
than a compulsion. This requirement, which appears rather far-fetched in theory, 
becomes less stringent in the empirical study: we only need to assume that 
characteristics outside the individual’s control (such as illness) are independent of 
the individual characteristics, rather than consequent upon such characteristics, e.g. 
as a result of a modelled decision. 
In accordance with the model of Stock and Wise (1988), retirement can be 
regarded as an option. Until the application for retirement, the individual has the 
opportunity to work, and afterwards he receives a pension. The option to switch in 
the rth period has the value Vt(r) in the tth period: 
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where β is a discount factor describing time preference and is constant for 
everyone, i is the interest rate, Uw is the utility function applicable during work, Ur is 
the utility function applicable in pensioner status, Ys is the income offered by work, 
Ps is the income offered by pension. In every period, the question for the decision 
maker is whether it is worth retiring in t, or postponing it to the later time of r. For 
this, the expected realisable positive gain must be examined for every r, which can be 
simply formulated as 10 
G(r)=Et[Vt(r)] – Et[Vt(t)].  
According to Stock and Wise (1988), who examined the impact of the structure 
of US occupational pensions on retirement, both salaries and pensions have a strong, 
but different, correlation to age. Though in a somewhat different form, this 
correlation is also applicable in Hungary: salaries increase with age, but at some 
                                                 
10 The decision rule contains the expected value of utilities instead of the utility of the expected value 
of incomes. In general, this is not an accurate wording, but the authors find that this compromise is 
worth making to simplify the discussion. 
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point this increase comes to a halt, and then goes into reverse. Though the pension is 
a function of the total life earnings and the time of service, it can be forecast with 
sufficient certainty from the final salary (see later). 
Let us now modify the value function to explicitly express the probability of 
employment, as well as the pension and unemployment benefit: 
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where R is the time when everyone retires, regardless of calculations (the legal 
retirement age), Ns is the indicator of pensioner status in s, p is the probability of non-
employment as a function of pensioner status and individual characteristics zs, Bs is 
the amount of the unemployment benefit, Ps is the amount of the pension. 
Accordingly, the first line contains the average of the utility of incomes from work or 
from unemployment benefit, weighted with the probability of non-unemployment 
and unemployment, aggregated up until retirement. The second line contains the 
same two income sources for the post-retirement period, but here unemployment 
benefit is replaced by the pension, and non-unemployment by the probability of 
employment. Importantly, the latter probabilities are not identical in the two cases. In 
this case, the utility function difference underlying the decision is:   
( )[ ] ( )[ ][ ]{ }∑−
=
− =+=−=−+=−==
1
)0()()0(10|)()1(11|)(
r
ts
sssssssss
ts
t NpBUNpNYUPUNpNYUrG β
Even though this formulation allows people to work as pensioners, we have seen 
that the probability of this is close to zero. If we take this as an assumption, that is 
p(Ns=1)=1, the above formula becomes simpler: 
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This is the formula that we may use to quantify the motives of behaviour. 
However, before discussing that, we must clarify one important issue: does 
the above decision rule take available incomes sufficiently into account? Could the 
other income earned in the informal economy, or the compensatory effect of a 
cohabiting partner, be significant factors? If the answer is yes, the model may 
perform poorly.  
3.1 Digression: the alternatives to inactivity and compensatory 
effects 
If retirement also means inactivity, it will almost certainly result in a certain 
loss of income. The degree of that loss depends on the amount of the original income 
and of the pension awarded. If the drop is significant at both the individual and 
household levels, some adaptation is to be expected. At the individual level, it is 
possible to exploit some new sources of income (second job, casual work, overtime, 
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or, in the case of somebody not previously in employment, taking up a job), and at 
the household level savings can be achieved. Both phenomena may reveal a lot about 
the impacts of the inactivity of a member of the household, because, in the event of 
significant loss, the household will (probably) try to find a substitute for the income, 
or reduce and rearrange expenditure to make sure the most important articles can 
still be purchased. 
3.2 Change in income and expenditure based on raw data 
The effect of the change in status can be quantified most easily, in the case of 
households that are unchanged with respect to their other characteristics, by 
deducting from one another the values of the examined income and expenditure 
types measured at two points in time. We can easily do this when using panel data, 
avoiding confusion of the act of retirement with other effects: the difference thus 
obtained can be regarded as the effect of becoming inactive, with some limitations. 
Importantly, due to the nature of the HBS data,11 we cannot use the data from a given 
year and the subsequent year for this purpose; instead, an additional year must be 
inserted in between. Thus, the basis for comparison is the data from t=1 and t=3 
(where t is the time). However, this procedure could also play an important role even 
if it were not demanded by the data: the characteristics of ‘pensioner existence’ can 
probably be observed better at a later point in time, once the time necessary for 
adaptation has elapsed. 
We have prepared the calculation in several variants: for men and women, 
and broken down by the status of the examined person as unemployed or employed 
in the first period. In order to eliminate uncontrolled impacts, we have made the 
number of people in the household and the activity of the partner constant. This 
minimises the potentially disturbing changes, but it precludes the possibility of 
extensive adaptation, such as taking up employment. As the correlation between the 
change in activity of partners is approximately 5 per cent, the adaptation thus 
excluded is not significant. The limitation has the additional disadvantage that the 
sample size thus obtained is very small – accordingly, the results must be interpreted 
carefully. 
Tables A1, A2, A3 and A4 in Annex A show the outcome of the calculations 
described.12 Below we highlight figures from Table A1, describing changes in the 
                                                 
11Within a given year, we do not know when an individual’s income was received, only the total 
amount. Consequently, in the year of retirement, a given labour income/pension combination does 
not reveal whether the person earned a lot for a short period, or little for a long period. Even though, 
for 1998, we do know how long a certain type of income was received, this would have helped with 
only one third of our sample. 
12 In order to eliminate the difference in size of households, we have calculated the total income and 
expenditure per consumption unit, rather than the total income and expenditure in the part of the raw 
data tables indicating household income. Therefore it is possible that, when the labour income of the 
examined person and his partner is added, the amount is greater than the total labour income of the 
household. Tables ‘a’ always include estimated figures, rather than figures derived from the raw data. 
As here the method of estimation renders households comparable, I have not narrowed the sample, 
because this way the number of observations can be several times greater than the raw data. 
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case of men switching from employment to pensioner status. In the remaining tables 
we describe the effect of retirement on employed or unemployed women and 
unemployed men. The effects measured are very similar, though the change in 
income and consumption are even smaller. 
Table 3. The size and actual change of individual and partner income, if an employed male 
living with a partner becomes inactive as of period t=2 of the panel, and the activity of 
his partner remains unchanged (N=49)  
 Value in t=1 
Value 
in t=3 
Change 
(%) 
Ratio in 
t=1 (%) 
Ratio in 
t=3 (%) 
Own income      
Gross salaries 766 0 -100 80 0 
Other labour income 89 14 -84 9 3 
Pension 93 480 415 10 93 
Taxes 262 0 -100 27 0 
Total personal income (gross) 963 513 -47 100 100 
Total personal income (net) 702 513 -27 73 100 
      
Partner’s income      
Gross salaries 468 480 3 75 76 
Other labour income 40 29 -28 6 5 
Pension 94 107 14 15 17 
Taxes 154 152 -1 25 24 
Total personal income (gross) 622 629 1 100 100 
Total personal income (net) 469 477 2 75 76 
Note: Simple averages, with constant economic activity of the partner. Income elements 
representing a small proportion are not included, thus the total is not necessarily 100%. 
Source: own calculations from the relevant periods of the HBS pooled panel (see data 
description in Section 2). 
 
Table 3 highlights the self-evident fact that the labour income of a person 
declines upon retirement, and the pension becomes the main element of personal 
income. It is worth noting that the sizable, 47 per cent drop in gross income is not 
accompanied by any increase in personal income. On the contrary: other labour 
income also declines. On the other hand, net incomes decrease considerably less, by 
27 per cent. This is because pension, unlike labour income, is not taxable. The 
situation is even simpler regarding the income of the partner: there is no sign of 
adaptation (in either direction). 
Some income elements are present at the household, rather than the individual, 
level. Examples include some social aid payments, the gains from the household’s 
agricultural production, and transfers. Table 4 shows the trends of those income 
sources, as well as of the per capita personal incomes at the level of the household. 
The latter information is important because, even though it partly coincides in its 
content with the figures in Table 3, we can argue that it is the size of per capita 
income, rather than of personal income, that substantially affects individual welfare, 
and thus the decision to carry on working or to retire. 
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Table 4. The size and actual change in the household’s income, if an employed male living 
with a partner becomes inactive as of period t=2 of the panel, and the activity of his 
partner remains unchanged (N=49) 
 Value in t=1 
Value 
in t=3 
Change 
(%) 
Ratio in 
t=1 (%) 
Ratio in 
t=3 (%) 
Household income      
Gross salary 655 267 -59 65 34 
Gain from agricultural 
production 32 35 9 3 4 
Other labour income 66 24 -64 7 3 
Own production 93 76 -18 9 10 
Pension 99 309 213 10 40 
Transfer related to child 25 18 -26 2 2 
Transfer to other household 25 28 12 3 4 
Taxes 209 79 -62 21 10 
Total income (gross) 1008 779 -23 100 100 
Total income (net) 773 672 -13 77 86 
Notes: Simple averages, with constant economic activity of the partner. 
Income elements representing a small proportion are not included, thus the total is not 
necessarily 100%. 
Source: own calculations from the relevant periods of the HBS pooled panel (see data 
description in Section 2). 
 
The results of the table are in line with what we said above. Apart from a 
minimal increase in gain from agricultural production, none of the income sources 
increase. As an important factor, the decline in total net income is only 13 per cent, 
half the figure calculated for the individual level. 
In incomes we see no sign that the reported income of either the retiring 
person or the partner has changed to compensate for the loss necessarily suffered. It 
is questionable, however, whether we should accept the income figures as genuine. 
There is the possibility that, if the compensation is not through legal employment, 
the income thus earned will not be reflected in the survey. The interviewer may 
appear to be an official person, from whom such sensitive information is better 
concealed: incomes are asked about only once, and they must be recorded in the 
journal only once. 
There is no such problem with consumption expenditure. The ‘total’ is derived 
from innumerable small expenditure items, which are very difficult, if not impossible, 
to manipulate. Naturally, we can infer a change in income from a change in the size 
of expenditure only if savings develop in accordance with some rule of thumb: for 
instance, as a fixed percentage of income. Table 5 shows the change in the level and 
structure of consumption expenditure in a structure similar to that above, for the 
same household group. Assuming that consumers save a constant percentage of their 
income, the expenditure changes in the same direction as income. If we also assume 
savings to be zero, there is complete identity. The amount spent on consumer 
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durables declines on average, which also indicates a decline in the actual disposable 
income – even though the decline is slight. 
Table 5. The size and actual change in household expenditure, if an employed male living 
with a partner becomes inactive as of period t=2 of the panel, and the activity of his 
partner remains unchanged (N=49) 
 Value in t=1 
Value 
in t=3 
Change 
(%) 
Weight in 
t=1 (%) 
Weight 
in t=3 
(%) 
Food 254 220 -13 38 38 
Alcoholic beverages and 
tobacco 55 44 -19 8 7 
Self-produced consumption 93 76 -18 14 13 
Clothing 53 27 -49 8 5 
Housing upkeep 109 113 3 16 19 
Transport 70 63 -9 10 11 
Other 135 120 -11 20 20 
Total expenditure 675 587 -13 100 100 
Expanded total expenditure 737 644 -13   
Durables 37 34 -8   
Notes: Simple averages, with constant economic activity of the partner. 
Source: own calculations from the relevant periods of the HBS pooled panel (see data 
description in Section 2). 
 
Not only the size, but also the structure of expenditure may reveal the 
existence of employment, and thus of unreported income. Expenditure on clothing, 
transport and meals out generally accompanies employment. In the absence of 
employment, or as more time is spent in the home, certain other items are consumed 
in greater quantities: the most important example is expenditure on upkeep of the 
home (heating, lighting). Almost each related item in Table 5 (except for transport) 
supports a decline in labour and an increase in time spent at home. 
The same phenomenon can be interpreted from another aspect: we can 
examine the change in the amount spent on clothing and on small-value durable 
articles using the idea of Browning and Crossley (2004). Accordingly, in the case of a 
significant drop in income, the most important way of adapting consumption is to 
cut back on purchases of replacement articles. The change in expenditure ratios 
indicates that disposable incomes declined, even if only slightly. 
There is a more direct relationship between the structure of expenditure and 
income, namely the Engel curve: the proportion of the various categories of goods in 
the expenditure structure changes typically with total income (for this and 
consumption expenditure see the standard work of Deaton and Muellbauer, 1999). 
Engel first noted the positive correlation between income and food expenditure, 
which translates to a negative correlation when we look at the share of food 
expenditure, rather than its level. In Table 5 the proportion of expenditure on food 
does not change, which goes slightly against our previous conclusions, because it 
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appears to suggest a near-constant income level. However, if we take into 
consideration that the correlation is with disposable income, not with total income, it 
appears to be reasonable, because the reduction in savings and in the consumption of 
durables may allow disposable income to be maintained at an unchanged level. 
Unfortunately, we have no direct information about the former, but the latter is 
underpinned by the evidence of Table 5. 
3.3 More accurate measurement of the changes in income and 
expenditure 
The problem with the above approach is that, even though we are going to 
capture the actual loss suffered, it remains a question how much of that loss is 
attributable to retirement? It is possible that the change measured would have 
happened irrespective of the change in the individual’s career, due to economic 
processes: the decision maker in the outlined model also compares his pension with 
expected future income, rather than with his present salary. 
To answer that question, we should consult the literature on economic policies 
(in Hungarian, Kézdi, 2004 can be recommended as a thorough introduction). In this 
approach, the retirement is the change (‘treatment’), the effects of which we want to 
measure. Let us now consider the difference in the income of those who retired and 
those who did not retire between the first and second periods; let us call those 
differences DNY and DD, respectively. Assuming that every person (pensioner or not) 
is the same in his observable and related non-observable characteristics, and the 
world has changed only in terms of its observable characteristics, DNY would 
measure the effect perfectly. However, if we allow the world to have changed, then 
the change in the income of those who did not become inactive (DD–t) can be 
regarded as the ‘trend’ of income change of otherwise identical individuals and must 
be deducted from the first change.13 Thus the difference now net of the ‘trend’ can be 
regarded as a much better approximation of the effects of inactivity. In practice, the 
comparison is performed with a regression technique, and we try to achieve the 
‘everybody is identical’ assumption by employing appropriate control variables. 
The estimate can be influenced by two factors: measurement errors, and the 
non-observable factors relating to becoming inactive. As the former are present 
mostly on the left side of the equation, they can be disregarded.14 Among non-
observed variables, the effect of ‘productivity’ or ‘abilities’, notoriously missing from 
the estimates of salary equations, should be mentioned in particular, as this may 
introduce heterogeneity into the behaviour of apparently similar persons. Later we 
shall see that such an effect appears unlikely, and therefore the above method may be 
legitimate. 
                                                 
13 In the literature, this procedure is called the ‘Difference in differences’ method. 
14 I have disregarded the measurement error of the explanatory variables because the panel structure 
of the database allows for a wide-ranging control of the data. The right side includes only 
demographic or activity variables, the integrity of which we verified previously. 
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The ‘a’ tables of Annex A (A1a, A2a, A3a, A4a) show the results obtained 
through regression estimates, while the estimated equation is specified at the 
beginning of the Annex. Instead of a detailed description of the results, a brief 
summary should suffice: the correction does not lead to results qualitatively different 
from the previous ones. The loss of income is also slight using the alternative 
procedure; it is certainly smaller than the raw data would indicate. This means that 
not only have the retired lost little actual income as compared to their former, 
employed status, but their loss is smaller than it would have been had they remained 
in employment. Accordingly, it appears that there is no financial argument against 
retirement. 
3.4 Work in the black economy? – back to the Engel curve  
As is evidenced by convincing research results, the size of the black economy 
in Hungary is not negligible (see Lackó, 2000), and there is a recurring suspicion in 
connection with those in early retirement that they do black labour under the 
protective umbrella of the pension, abusing the weaknesses of the regulation. As we 
compare the proportions of food expenditure in two periods, in effect we invert the 
Engel curves, and compare the income levels implied by them. To achieve 
appropriate results, the expenditure ratios of two groups must be compared – this 
method is formalised in the paper by Lyssiotou et al. (2004). In his article, which sets 
out to measure the size of the black economy in the UK, he attempts to compare the 
real income of the self-employed and of employees. According to his assumption, 
there is no concealed income in the case of employees, while in the case of the self-
employed it does exist, and every respondent reveals the correct amount spent on 
foodstuffs. However, estimation of the size of concealed income requires not only the 
above assumptions, but also that the dispersion of the income of the self-employed is 
greater than that of employees. 
Even though we have everything we need to implement the idea, our 
experiments on the HBS have been unsuccessful. The income (and total expenditure) 
of the pensioners surveyed did not disperse any more than the income of non-
pensioners. During the estimation of the Engel curves, after the insertion of 
appropriate control variables, the ‘pensioner’ indicator did not signal any difference 
in the amount of food consumption. As we should have seen both phenomena 
(greater dispersion of incomes, and a significant impact of pensioner status) to 
identify concealed income, its presence appears to be impossible. Though this result 
can be interpreted as a failure of the model, it is not necessarily so: the result that no 
concealed income can be detected is in line with our findings hitherto. 
4. Empirical examination of the retirement decision 
The empirical framework described in Section 3 leads to a decision-making 
rule which, if specified appropriately, is suitable for the measurement of effects 
influencing the retirement decision. The relationship can be described as follows: 
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In the above equation, NY is the indicator of retirement (1 or 0), w is the wage 
at the time of the decision, e is the probability of employment (non-unemployment), 
p is the amount of pension, z is the sum of personal characteristics that determine or 
directly influence the probability of unemployment, v is a random term independent 
of the previous elements. This simple formulation relies on a number of assumptions, 
for instance that the expected future wage trend is sufficiently described by the wage 
in the period concerned, as well as the interaction of the wage and the variable 
estimating the probability of employment. The latter will be approximated in practice 
by the wage and some of the z characteristics. The estimation can be performed using 
an appropriate econometric model (logit/probit).15 Before doing so, however, let us 
take a look at the above variables, starting with individual characteristics. We expect 
that every factor that increases the benefits of employment has a negative impact on 
the probability of retirement, and every factor increasing the benefits of retirement 
has a positive effect. 
Lelkes and Scharle (2004) estimated the probabilities of inactivity for males 
below retirement age but above 40. According to their results, the probability of 
inactivity is increased by low educational attainment, closeness to the retirement age, 
residence in an underdeveloped region and living alone. The problem investigated is 
somewhat different (inactivity vs. pension), and the two approaches are different in 
two further important respects. First, here we have used flow rather than stock data. 
Secondly, we have treated separately the people exiting unemployment and those 
exiting employment status. To facilitate monitoring of the reasons for the potential 
difference in the results, we have made the estimates, wherever possible, using both 
cross-section and flow data. 
Thus the surveyed population is the group of people over 40 but at least one 
year younger than the retirement age effective in 1997 who do not live alone, who, in 
the first period of the three periods examined, 1) were working, and had no pension-
type income, or 2) were unemployed in accordance with the definition of the HBS. In 
both groups, the ‘positive’ outcome is if, in the second period, someone had pension 
income as well, and in the third period had predominantly16 such income. 
The model variants and explanatory variables are summarised below (the 
models marked ‘k’ are the variants of the models with the same number estimated 
using cross-section data): 
 
                                                 
15 It is clear that the greatest simplification occurred before the aforementioned assumption was made, 
when we modelled the decision in the simplified form disclosed. Though this is a radically reworked 
form of the ‘real’ rule, the paper of Lumisdale, Stock and Wise (2000) points out that, if the pension 
expectation is considered appropriately, the highly complex models that can be estimated only 
through simulations do not perform any better than a simple bivariate econometric model. In our case, 
errors could have arisen more when approximating the size of the expectation.  
16 More specifically: over the year had no labour income that amounted to more than 2 months’ 
pension, and that could be regarded as the continuation of his previous employment. 
 24
Variable From unemployment From employment 
 1. 2. 2.k 1. 2. 2.k 3. 4. 
W         
 Gross salary 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 
W*e         
 Salary*qualification 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 
P         
 Expected pension 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 
Z         
 School qualification 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
 Age (dummies) 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
 Gender 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
 Aid in own right in t=1 9 9 n/a 9 9 n/a 9 9 
 Sick pay in t=1 8 8 n/a 9 9 n/a 9 9 
 Partner’s activity 8 9 9 8 9 9 9 9 
 Micro-region’s part. rate 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
 Type of settlement 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
 Period 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
 
Multiplying the salary and the ‘qualification’ variable (at least secondary 
qualification) reflects the effect of the uncertainty of employment on the expected 
income. Of the z variable group, age and qualification capture employment 
potentials and labour market differences not explained by other factors. The ‘social 
aid in own right’ and the ‘partner’s activity’ variables capture the funds available in 
addition to the employment income.17 The micro-region’s activity rate, the type of 
settlement and the period indicators characterise and keep constant the economic 
environment of the decision, which is especially needed due to the use of ‘stockpiled’ 
panel data. Finally, the sick pay variable is an indicator of health condition, which is 
unfortunately available only for those who were employed. 
For the sake of comparison, we have estimated the narrowest model 1, 
adapted to the unemployed, using the HBS panel as the cross section. The outcomes 
described in Annex B are mostly in line with the results of the study by Lelkes and 
Scharle (2004). As compared to those with fewer than eight years of elementary 
education, any additional qualification significantly reduces the ‘probability’ of 
pensioner status. The increase in age has a similar effect: its progress almost 
monotonously increases the already positive size of its effect. The existence of 
welfare aid has a negative effect, which indicates the restraining impact of additional 
financial resources. In the case of women, there is a greater probability of retirement, 
which may be explained by the division of labour between men and women, or the 
different employment structure and differences in the demand shocks on that 
                                                 
17 The partner’s activity can also be interpreted in a more complex framework, as a result of a joint 
activity strategy. The models of joint household decisions are too complex to be used here, but for 
methodological reasons it is important to note that if the decisions of two partners are simultaneous, 
and result in a binary variable, one can be included in the estimated equation without having to worry 
about its endogeneity (cf. Greene, 2002 on this subject). 
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structure. Partner activity has a substantial negative effect on the probability of 
retirement: as we have made the age constant, this is not the effect of cohabiting men 
and women being of similar age. Finally, we find more pensioners in the capital city 
than in the other parts of the country.  
4.1 Exiting unemployed status – empirical results 
Even though the majority of those entering inactivity were previously in 
employment, there is an important road through unemployment, as a detour to 
inactivity. Table 6 shows the estimated results of the retirement model on a 
population set limited to the unemployed. 
The only difference between the first and second models is that the latter also 
includes the partner’s activity – however, as this is not only insignificant but also has 
no effect on the impact of other variables, the two results can be treated as one, and 
the first column of Table 6 reflects the outcomes of both models. We should reiterate 
that the base population is that of the unemployed, which may explain this 
phenomenon through the underlying marked selection process. In line with this, the 
2k model is the counterpart of Model 2 estimated on cross-section data; this is why 
the number of elements is close to three times greater than in the panel data. 
Table 6. Probability of exiting from unemployment into pensioner status among males and 
females over 40 but below retirement age, living with a partner – probit estimate, 
marginal effect in the average of variables in the sample; (t=s refers to the sth wave of 
the panel) 
 1/2 2k 
Specialised qualification 0.175+ 0.030 
 (0.098) (0.053) 
Secondary qualification 0.189 0.005 
 (0.188) (0.060) 
Tertiary qualification 0.189 0.165** 
 (0.356) (0.033) 
Age   
49 0.002 0.139** 
 (0.137) (0.032) 
50 0.231 0.150** 
 (0.149) (0.025) 
51 -0.076 0.159** 
 (0.164) (0.031) 
52 0.598** 0.159** 
 (0.108) (0.027) 
53 0.414** 0.173** 
 (0.103) (0.019) 
54 0.624** 0.198** 
 (0.138) (0.019) 
55 0.488* 0.205** 
 (0.195) (0.019) 
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56 0.435+ 0.173** 
 (0.241) (0.029) 
57 0.619** 0.192** 
 (0.148) (0.020) 
58 0.631** 0.238** 
 (0.109) (0.016) 
Female 0.156** 0.139** 
 (0.061) (0.028) 
Unemployment benefit in 
t=1 -0.140** n/a 
 (0.048)  
Aid in own right in t=1 -0.095 n/a  
 (0.066)  
Part. rate (micro-region) -0.996** -0.158 
 (0.368) (0.178) 
1993-4-5 panel 0.328** 0.031 
 (0.090) (0.039) 
1996-7-8 panel 0.341** 0.005 
 (0.129) (0.037) 
Partner active -0.005 0.013 
 (0.050) (0.027) 
County town -0.045 0.009 
 (0.121) (0.038) 
Other urban 0.078 0.017 
 (0.096) (0.033) 
Village 0.003 -0.033 
 (0.074) (0.028) 
N 287 923 
Average of dependent 
variable 0.27 
0.76 
Log-likelihood -117 -187 
Pseudo-R2 0.30 0.63 
Notes: The reference group is that of males living in Budapest, who have not completed 
elementary education, receive no social aid in their own right or unemployment benefit, 
included in the 1999–2000 panel, whose partner is inactive. 
In parentheses, the asymptotic standard errors robust for the correlation within the micro-
regions. 
+ significant difference from 0 at 10–5% level; * significant difference from 0 at 5–1% level; ** 
significant difference from 0 at least at 1% level.  
 
It is worth noting that qualifications, which previously worked as a key 
variable, have a moderate impact in this case, and, compared to the unqualified, it is 
only among those with vocational school education that we see a smaller propensity 
(c. 0.2 per cent) to exit. Women and the elderly are more likely to retire than men. 
Importantly, two variables available to employment policy – unemployment benefit 
and the local employment rate – have significant effects: the former reduces the 
probability of exit into retirement by approximately 15 per cent. The absolute effect 
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of the local employment rate is close to one unit. The first two panels (1993–1998) 
show a considerably greater ‘autonomous’ propensity to go into retirement than the 
third panel. This is not necessarily because later on fewer unemployed people would 
have wanted to exit the labour market as old age pensioners: the most important 
such channel, early retirement, has not been available since 1997. Thus, after 1998, the 
kind of people who formerly became pensioners from being unemployed probably 
tried to retire from employment status, or made greater efforts and found jobs again. 
In numerical terms, the cross-section results are naturally different from the 
effect measured using the flow data. In qualitative terms, the results are similar for 
age and sex, while the effects of qualifications and the economic environment are 
very different. The latter has no significant impact, while in the cross-sectional 
equation it is the qualified, rather than the unqualified, who make a difference 
between the unemployed and the pensioners. The differences seen in the flow and 
stock data are attributable in this case (as well as later) to those people who had 
entered pensioner status before the surveyed period. Based on the outcomes, we are 
inclined to think that there are very few university graduates among those who 
retired in 1993 or before, but the place of residence of the typical pensioner or 
unemployed person does not differ based on the rate of employment. 
4.2 Exiting employed status – empirical results 
There are significant differences between the two routes into pensioned status 
– from unemployment or employment. Among the aging population, unemployment 
is rarer than among young people, largely due to the uncertainties involved in job 
hunting. Those who do become unemployed, and then pensioners, have probably 
had to resign themselves to this status for some reason. Therefore, those who become 
pensioners from being in employment have a position in the labour market that is 
slightly better than average, and this must be considered when interpreting the 
parameters. 
Table 7. Probability of transferring from employment to pensioner status among males and 
females over 40 but at least 2 years below retirement age – probit estimate, marginal 
effects in the average of variables in the sample; (t=k refers to the kth wave of the panel) 
 1 2 2k 3 4H 
Specialised qualification 0.039 0.043 -0.215** 0.042 0.037 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.055) (0.028) (0.029) 
Secondary qualification 0.054 0.067 -0.233** 0.044 0.046 
 (0.058) (0.062) (0.038) (0.058) (0.063) 
Tertiary qualification 0.001 0.017 -0.254** 0.008 0.009 
 (0.038) (0.048) (0.029) (0.047) (0.052) 
Age      
49 0.022 0.019 0.120** 0.020 0.020 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.043) (0.026) (0.025) 
50 0.012 0.006 0.198** 0.006 0.005 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.045) (0.022) (0.021) 
51 0.080* 0.065* 0.164** 0.063* 0.062+ 
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 (0.036) (0.032) (0.053) (0.032) (0.034) 
52 0.028 0.022 0.292** 0.020 0.019 
 (0.035) (0.031) (0.051) (0.030) (0.028) 
53 0.101** 0.080* 0.317** 0.077* 0.072* 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.045) (0.033) (0.032) 
54 0.095 0.080 0.291** 0.084 0.075 
 (0.065) (0.058) (0.064) (0.062) (0.048) 
55 0.108 0.087 0.389** 0.081 0.071 
 (0.068) (0.063) (0.054) (0.064) (0.053) 
56 0.147* 0.126+ 0.429** 0.132+ 0.120 
 (0.071) (0.067) (0.064) (0.071) (0.073) 
57 0.157+ 0.115 0.490** 0.120 0.107 
 (0.090) (0.076) (0.056) (0.079) (0.074) 
Female -0.003 -0.005 0.076** -0.013 0.023 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.022) (0.008) (0.022) 
Sick pay in t=1 0.055+ 0.052+ n/a 0.048+ 0.043+ 
 (0.031) (0.029) n/a (0.028) (0.025) 
Aid in own right in t=1 -0.005 -0.005 -0.133** -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.037) (0.014) (0.015) 
Partic. rate (micro-region) -0.027 -0.007 -1.140** 0.001 0.002 
 (0.056) (0.052) (0.165) (0.049) (0.056) 
1993-4-5 panel 0.026* 0.025* 0.015 0.025* 0.022+ 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.023) (0.012) (0.012) 
1996-7-8 panel 0.016 0.013 0.065* 0.009 0.007 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.026) (0.016) (0.015) 
Partner active  -0.031** -0.091** -0.029** -0.028** 
  (0.012) (0.027) (0.011) (0.011) 
Salary (HUF thousand)    -0.000* -0.001* 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Salary*Qualification     0.000 
     (0.000) 
Pension (HUF thousand)     0.002* 
     (0.001) 
County town 0.003 0.010 -0.099** 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.025) (0.014) (0.023) 
Other urban 0.004 0.009 -0.109** 0.000 -0.004 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.022) 
Village  0.017+ 0.019+ -0.054* 0.008 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.010) (0.023) 
N 1468 1468 2326 1468 1468 
Average of dependent variable 0.047 0.047 0.3 0.047 0.047 
Log-likelihood -250 -245 -1174 -245 -238.4 
Pseudo-R2 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.14 
Notes: The reference group is that of males living in Budapest, who have not completed 
elementary education, receive no social aid in their own right, included in the 1999–2000 
panel, who had not been on sick pay and whose partner is inactive. 
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In parentheses, the asymptotic standard errors robust for the correlation within the micro-
regions. 
+ significant difference from 0 at 10–5% level; * significant difference from 0 at 5–1% level; ** 
significant difference from 0 at least at 1% level.  
 
The first two columns in Table 7 show the measurement results of the two 
model versions estimated for the unemployed, with the difference that here the 
status variable for unemployment benefit is not included, while the first-period sick 
pay variable, which approximates health condition, is. The outcomes are surprising, 
as they are significantly different from the results gained for the unemployed and for 
the cross-sectional measurement of the entire population. Qualifications have no 
effect on retirement, and age starts to have a significant impact only one to two years 
before retirement age. While there is no apparent difference between the sexes, 
propensity to retire appears to be greater among village residents and in the early 
1990s. This is in line with the economic transition that occurred in the 1990s, which 
took its toll mostly among agricultural jobs. The existence of the first-period sick pay 
has a relatively strong and positive impact, which may be an indication of poor 
health. 
The effect of the variable indicating the activity of the partner does not 
significantly influence outcomes: the significance of the variable does not change – 
only the size of its effect may alter slightly. The magnitude of the impact is 
comparable to that of sick pay: one of the most important of the non-external 
characteristics. Estimating the model containing the partner using the cross-sectional 
data, we obtain results similar to those of the previous, full cross-sections and those 
published by Lelkes and Scharle (2004). The only group of indicators that is not 
significant is that denoting periods. Age, qualifications below eight elementary 
school years, and Budapest residence have a positive effect on the probability of 
retirement. The existence of individual aid, partner activity, and a higher 
participation rate in the micro-region have negative effects. These are all factors that 
also affect success in the labour market – in the opposite direction. Unlike the 
previous results, this outcome is closer to what we would intuitively expect. 
The difference between the models applied to flow and stock data may 
potentially be attributable to several reasons. First, the effect may be only apparent, 
and some variables may not be significant because of the small size of the sample. 
Even though far fewer people are included in the panel database, the number of 
observations is unlikely to be an effective limitation, given the number of variables. It 
is quite likely that the stock of early retirees was ‘filled up’ before the period under 
examination, rather than afterwards, by means of the mechanisms captured by the 
other equations. This difference should be taken into consideration when 
interpreting the various estimates, and also when hoping to activate the population 
in early retirement. 
Up to now the salaries of the employed played no role in the decision to retire: 
we have assumed that low and high earners have the same probability of retiring. 
Salaries may not only indicate factors influencing labour market potentials that 
cannot be observed; they may also constitute one of the key factors in the retirement 
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decision in accordance with the model in Section 3. Model 3 of Table 6 shows the 
outcome of the estimate made using salaries. The results show no major change 
compared to the previous results: the parameter-estimates of the other variables are 
practically unchanged, while those of salary are significant statistically, but their 
practical importance appears to be small. One of the reasons for the almost totally 
negligible effect could be the fact that in the equation salaries represent not only 
themselves but also the size of the pension, which is also important in the model. 
4.3 Estimation of the pension and potential selection 
If we know the size of the expected pension and, in the case of continued 
employment, the expected salary for every pensioner and non-pensioner, we can 
quantify their individual effect simply, by inserting them into a regression equation. 
However, as the pension cannot be observed in the case of employees, its expected 
amount must be computed. 
In the Hungarian pension system, the pension is computed based on the gross 
salary of employees in the years before retirement. If we do not know the work 
history and the salaries of the final years, the pension cannot be identified accurately. 
However, a comparison of the gross salaries and pensions measured in the HBS 
reveals that the gross salary of the last year before retirement explains 60 per cent of 
the dispersion of the amount of the awarded pension. According to expectation, the 
explanatory power can be strengthened only by a factor observed at the present time: 
the interaction of salary and gender variables, which reflects the average shorter 
working career of women and other effects that influence the wage differences 
between men and women. There are no other variables in the HBS that would 
effectively contribute to forecasting the amount of the pension. 
Figure 3 shows the correlation between gross salaries and pensions in the case 
of pensioners retiring before and after the retirement age. To facilitate interpretation, 
the figure also contains the imaginary line of 100 per cent substitution, where 1 Forint 
of salary would become 1 Forint of pension. The different positions of the two 
substitution lines reveal that, due to the constant exchange between the minimum 
pension and the salary and pension Forints (close-linearity of the substitution line), in 
the lower range of salaries (especially for early retirement) the substitution is 
sometimes more than 100 per cent, gradually declining towards higher salaries – and 
higher pensions. Even though, in the higher salary range, the correlation is looser 
(probably here the relationship between the final and previous periods becomes 
looser18), it is fairly good for salaries as a whole. The figure does not depict this, but 
as explained earlier, the exchange rate of salaries and pensions is worse for women 
than for men – probably because of the years of service missing due to child rearing. 
Thus, in the case of women, the substitution line is less steep. 
                                                 
18 More specifically: in the higher earnings ranges only the dispersion of the pensions is higher, while 
their expected value appears to be a function of salaries in accordance with the previous rule. 
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Fig. 3. Empirical relationship between gross labour income and pension; full year figures 
measured in year 2003 HUF 
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Source: own calculations based on the relevant periods of the HBS pooled panel (see data 
description in Section 2).  
 
If we project the anticipated pension for those who have not yet retired on the 
basis of the substitution equation described above, we do not take seriously the 
prediction of the theoretical model. In line with that, we should find that those who 
receive more benefit from retirement are more likely to retire. If that is true, however, 
then the two populations are different in some features, and the expected pension 
amount of the not-yet-retired cannot be predicted from the substitution line of the 
already retired. 
The ‘4H’ column in Table 8 shows the selection equation of the two-tier 
Heckman selection model, without the supplementary pension equation (the so-
called ‘structural probit’ from the two, systemic equations). This estimate is 
essentially analogous to the previous one, where the estimated value of the 
anticipated pension is also included, and factoring in the possibility that the retired 
are systematically different from those who continue in employment. The variable 
performing the selection correction, however, is not significant, and thus we could 
have estimated the pension even using the simple smallest square method. At the 
same time, the importance of salaries in the retirement equation has changed: 
retaining its significance, its effect has become substantial. A 10 thousand HUF salary 
increase reduces the probability of retirement by one percentage point, while a 
similar increase in the pension results in a two percentage point increase in 
probability. It is obvious that the effect of the salaries is weak primarily because it 
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also incorporates the contrary effect of the pension. In effect, we can state that the 
direct financial incentives, salaries and pensions have a more than negligible effect 
on retirement. Still, we found no selection effect, probably due to the characteristics 
of the pension system. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
Using the CSO Household Budget Survey (HBS), the study looked at the early 
retirement of people over 40 but below the retirement age, who live in families. Due 
to its size and the extent of its inactivity, this age cohort is one of the largest potential 
labour sources. If there is firm political will to reduce inactivity, it is essential to 
know which factors in the demand and supply of labour are responsible for the 
current situation and which can be influenced by market-compatible instruments. 
International comparison reveals that any (further) raising of the age of retirement 
could bring about an improvement in employment, provided demand develops 
adequately. Even though no detailed analysis has been prepared on this issue, the 
rise in retirement age of recent years has also been followed by increased 
employment in the affected age groups (primarily among women). Even so, the 
reduction of the inflow into pensioner status may be more successful in the younger 
groups, which are potentially easier to employ. Since it is a complex decision process 
for an individual to exit the labour market and stay outside, in this paper we looked 
at the labour market behaviour of people who retired before the retirement age, and 
of their partners. 
The switch between labour market statuses is the result of a decision, which is 
governed by labour-related preferences, as well as by personal and institutional 
circumstances. In Hungary we find that many of the elderly people who are still 
below the official retirement age are pensioners, which means, in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, that they are not in employment. In connection with their 
behaviour, the fundamental issue is whether, in the current labour market 
environment and the institutional framework of the pension system, there is any 
opportunity for them to work instead of staying inactive in the safety of pensioner 
status. We know that, up until at least 2002, the retirement ages for 1997 remained 
effective, and so the practical task was actually to look at early retirement as defined 
at that time. Thus, on the one hand, we have attempted to identify the individual and 
household characteristics that increase the propensity for inactivity, as well as the 
correlations thereof, and on the other hand, we have tried to show how the size and 
composition of income changes as a result of inactivity. The structure of the HBS 
panel allowed us to review the labour market role and financial strategy of the entire 
household, tracking changes over time. 
This study attempted to quantify the role of the various factors in the 
retirement decision, based on a simple decision-making model. The model hinges on 
the assumption that early retirement, mostly disability pensioner status, may be a 
potential means of escaping the difficulties of the labour market. Therefore we have 
assumed that the individuals are relatively free to take the decision to use that 
possibility, aware of the benefits and costs of retirement. The main question is to 
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what extent the retirement decision is influenced, apart from individual 
characteristics, by the financial incentives, primarily the amount of the salary and of 
the pension. 
Before we can assess the effects of controllable incomes, we must be able to 
establish what percentage they represent within people’s income. Tracking through 
time allows us to assess the financial loss entailed in the change of status at the level 
of the individual and the household. The results indicate that retirement does not 
bring about any drastic decline in the financial position of people. 
Despite the fact that the difference between the average pension of all 
pensioners and the average net salary of all employees in the same period is quite big, 
the actual financial loss does not exceed 27 per cent of previous net salary in any of 
the cases examined. The per capita household income declines by approximately 13 
per cent on average if an employee retires, whereas no change was witnessed if an 
unemployed person becomes a pensioner. The results do not change even if we filter 
out the effects of the change in the economic environment over time. Naturally, 
changes reveal nothing about absolute income levels: any loss may be enormous for 
someone who is poor at the start. It is also an obvious but important conclusion that 
the actual financial loss to people living on their own may be greater than to those 
who share a household with others. 
It is often assumed that people who retire early exploit their protected status 
to work in the black, or at least grey, sector of the economy. The available income 
data are often distorted, and therefore do not necessarily answer that question; but 
the structure of expenditure can be regarded as a reliable indicator. Despite the 
varying data quality, the change in both income and expenditure indicates that after 
retirement no unexpected sources of income appear, and the average person in early 
retirement does not seek to supplement his income through employment in either the 
white or the grey economy. 
Finally, we looked at the effects of the factors that influence the decision to 
retire, and this led us to two important conclusions. First, the models calculated from 
flow data typically yielded different results than other models using stock data 
estimated from the HBS data or other data sources. As the flow data run from 1994 
through the 1990s, we can assume that the difference is attributable to retirements 
prior to 1994. If our goal is to create instruments that are available to policy makers, it 
is important to take into consideration these differences, since the population of 
newly retiring people is different from that of current pensioners: they are better 
qualified and have a more successful work history. The other important lesson 
relates to the effect of salaries and expected pensions on retirement. According to our 
results, both factors have a significant impact, in the expected direction: higher 
earners are less likely to go into early retirement than those earning less, while 
people who can expect higher pensions are more likely to decide to retire. However, 
because of the link between the pension and the final salary, the amount of the 
pension has a more important effect. 
What lessons can social and employment policy learn from all this? From 
among the two sides shaping inactivity trends, i.e. labour demand and supply, we 
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have looked at the latter, in particular the effects of financial incentives and the 
potential for household adaptation. The two factors are in surprising harmony. In the 
population studied, the loss of job generally does not represent such pressure that 
returning to the labour market would be an attractive proposition. In many cases, 
both income and expenditure change so smoothly on the transition into inactivity 
that this change in itself does not present a serious argument for a return to the 
labour market, especially in view of the spare time gained. On average, the role of 
active adaptation is very slight: people survive the decline in their income without 
changing their behaviour, by reducing their work-related consumption. Thus it 
appears that, even though it is generally difficult to find a job as a pensioner, there is 
no real demand anyway, because it is not made essential by financial constraint. At 
the same time, we have seen that financial incentives – the labour income earned as 
an employee and the amount of the pension – do have significant effects on the 
transition to pensioner status. 
Consequently, several complex measures are probably required if we are to 
reduce inactivity. The raising of the (effective) retirement age, as urged by the Lisbon 
agenda of the EU, is only one, albeit very important, possible step. Even so, tighter 
control of entry into inactivity appears to be essential. Results indicate that 
retirement is too easy, especially compared to the strict regulation of transfers to the 
unemployed. However, we can draw definitive conclusions only if we find out to 
what extent people retiring ‘cheaply’ would have been able to keep their previous 
jobs or to find another job in the labour market. The findings of this study, indicating 
that higher salaries reduce the probability that people will retire early, may give 
direction to interventions that serve primarily to reduce wage costs and thus 
potentially to provide more income to employees. This important issue may be the 
subject of a subsequent study. 
In our view, the results indicate that, to facilitate the clearer separation of 
employment and social objectives and the related instruments, the social aspect of 
retirement, and especially of early retirement, must be eliminated; that function 
should be assumed by other designated institutions. If the institution of early 
retirement survives, we must consider dramatically increasing the losses entailed by 
such a decision, because, in the case of a fundamentally growth-oriented and 
medium income-level economy, this is a luxury article. Even though the data 
examined indicate this only indirectly, through gauging the probability of transit to 
pensioner status, a comprehensive review of the system of disability pensions, a 
reasonable tightening of eligibility criteria, and encouragement to exit that status are 
of utmost importance, together with rehabilitation of patients who can be cured. 
The disappearance of the forms of early retirement and the potential raising of 
the retirement age would dramatically worsen unemployment indicators, but 
activity ratios would improve. Even more importantly, however, we would call a 
spade a spade, and would identify the increasingly important challenge: to resolve 
the issue of employing the elderly. 
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Annex A – Changes in the income of households and partners, 
and expenditure of households, when one member becomes 
inactive 
The equation estimated for the four [gender] x [original activity category] 
groups was the following (using the description of linear models): 
 
∆VÁLTOZÓ13 ~ INAKT23 + PMN1_IN3 + PMN1_DOL3 + PIN1_MN3 + 
PIN1_DOL3 + PDOL1_MN3 + ∆DOLOZOK13 + ALAPFOK + KOZEPFOK + 
FELSOFOK + PALAPFOK + PKOZEPFOK + PFELSOFOK + KOR + PKOR + 
PANEL1 + PANEL2, 
where the variables are interpreted as follows: 
∆VÁLTOZÓ13: the difference in the values of the relevant variable measured 
in the 3rd and 1st periods  
INAKT23: indicator variable denoting those inactive in the 2nd and 3rd 
periods  
PMN1_IN3, PMN1_DOL3, PIN1_MN3, PIN1_DOL3, PDOL1_MN3: indicator 
showing the transition between the labour market statuses of the partner in the 1st 
and 3rd periods – MunkaNélküli (Unemployed), Inaktív (inactive), DOLgozik 
(Employed) 
∆DOLOZOK13: difference in the number of working members of the 
household in the 1st and 3rd periods  
(P)ALAPFOK, (P)KOZEPFOK, (P)FELSOFOK: indicators of the school 
achievement (of partner) (elementary, secondary, tertiary)  
(P)KOR: the age (of partner) in years  
PANEL1, PANEL2: indicator of the relevant panel 
 
It should be noted that the above equation is applicable to every variable examined, 
but it is not ‘tailored’ to any one of them. The thorough modelling of the expenditure 
alone would deserve a separate paper, and no state-of-the-art empirical expenditure 
model has been devised in Hungary as yet. Despite these considerations, we decided 
to use an identical, simple function format to estimate every income and expenditure 
category. In addition to easy manageability and transparency, this had the result that 
the characteristics and constraints required by consumption theory are not reflected 
in the model. For instance, if we add the estimated changes to the previous value, we 
get negative expenditure for the product category concerned, and total expenditure 
in excess of the entire expenditure for the entirety of products. Taking this into 
consideration, the structure of the ‘plain’ and ‘a’ tables are different: for instance, in 
the latter we do not disclose the hypothetical structure of income and expenditure in 
the third period. 
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Table A1. Size and actual change in household income and expenditure, and in own and 
partner’s income, if a working male living with a partner becomes inactive as of the 2nd 
period of the panel, and the partner’s activity does not change (N=49) 
 Value in t=1 
Value 
in t=3 
Change 
(%) 
Weight in 
t=1 (%) 
Weight 
in t=3 
(%) 
Household income      
Gross salary 655 267 -59  65  34  
Severance pay 0 1  0  0  
Agric. profit 32 35 9  3  4  
Other labour income 66 24 -64  7  3  
From savings 10 2 -79  1  0  
From own production 93 76 -18  9  10  
Other income 8 7 -11  1  1  
Pension 99 309 213  10  40  
Unemployment transfer 7 8 13  1  1  
Child-related transfer 25 18 -26  2  2  
Other public transfer 6 12 80  1  1  
Transfer from other household 6 20 224  1  3  
Transfer to other household 25 28 12  3  4  
Taxes and contributions 209 79 -62  21  10  
Total income (gross) 1008 779 -23  100  100  
Total income (net) 773 672 -13  77  86  
      
Household expenditure      
Food 254 220 -13  38  38  
Alcohol and tobacco 55 44 -19  8  7  
Self-produced consumption 93 76 -18  14  13  
Clothing 53 27 -49  8  5  
Home upkeep expenses 109 113 3  16  19  
Transport 70 63 -9  10  11  
Other 135 120 -11  20  20  
Total expenditure 675 587 -13  100  100  
Extended total expenditure 737 644 -13    
Durable articles 37 34 -8    
      
Own income      
Gross salary 766 0 -100  80  0  
Other income from full-time 
job 1 0 -100  0  0  
Severance pay 0 0  0  0  
Other labour income 89 14 -84  9  3  
Other income 6 0 -100  1  0  
Pension 93 480 415  10  93  
Unemployment income 4 7 60  0  1  
Child-related transfers 0 0  0  0  
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Other personal public transfers 4 13 234  0  3  
Taxes and contributions 262 0 -100  27  0  
Total personal income (gross) 963 513 -47  100  100  
Total personal income (net) 702 513 -27  73  100  
      
Partner’s income      
Gross salary 468 480 3  75  76  
Other income from full-time 
job 0 0  0  0  
Severance pay 0 0  0  0  
Other labour income 40 29 -28  6  5  
Other income 5 2 -59  1  0  
Pension 94 107 14  15  17  
Unemployment income 14 4 -71  2  1  
Child-related transfers 0 0  0  0  
Other personal public transfers 0 6  0  1  
Taxes and contributions 154 152 -1  25  24  
Total personal income (gross) 622 629 1  100  100  
Total personal income (net) 469 477 2  75  76  
Notes: Simple averages with constant economic activity of partner. 
Source: own calculations based on the relevant periods of the HBS pooled panel (see data 
description in Section 2).  
Table A1a: Size of household income and expenditure, and of own and partner’s income, as 
well as the changes therein estimated by excluding other effects, if a working male living 
with a partner becomes inactive as of the 2nd period of the panel (N=1041) 
 Value in t=1 Ratio (%) Change Std. Error S. Change (%) 
Household income       
Gross salary 1614 68  -371 102 * -23  
Severance pay 6 0  0 12  4  
Agric. profit 33 1  12 36  35  
Other labour income 198 8  -23 56  -12  
From savings 8 0  -29 12 * -369  
From own production 198 8  -26 27  -13  
Other income 20 1  -5 13  -28  
Pension 101 4  284 27 * 281  
Unemployment transfer 31 1  -16 14  -52  
Child-related transfer 124 5  5 21  4  
Other public transfer 15 1  10 10  67  
Transfer from other household 26 1  22 9 * 87  
Transfer to other household 53 2  -3 17  -6  
Taxes and contributions 532 22  -149 43 * -28  
Total income (gross) 2374 100  -138 111  -6  
Total income (net) 1789 75  14 87  1  
       
Household expenditure       
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Food 587 37  -56 39  -10  
Alcohol and tobacco 102 6  -17 14  -17  
Self-produced consumption 198 12  -26 27  -13  
Clothing 140 9  -5 19  -3  
Home upkeep expenses 248 16  -18 16  -7  
Transport 184 12  4 24  2  
Other 326 21  -48 39  -15  
Total expenditure 1587 100  -140 86  -9  
Extended total expenditure 1776 112  -75 115  -4  
Durable articles 99 6  18 52  19  
       
Own income       
Gross salary 926 85  -466 73 * -50  
Other income from full-time 
job 0 0  -1 1  -292  
Severance pay 3 0  0 11  -6  
Other labour income 146 13  -26 48  -18  
Other income 4 0  -7 8  -183  
Pension 9 1  304 19 * 3329  
Unemployment income 4 0  -21 8 * -583  
Child-related transfers 0 0  0 0   
Other personal public 
transfers 1 0  6 3 * 712  
Taxes and contributions 331 30  -160 33 * -49  
Total personal income (gross) 1093 100  -210 67 * -19  
Total personal income (net) 762 70  -50 43  -7  
       
Partner’s income       
Gross salary 523 81  60 41  12  
Other income from full-time 
job 0 0  0 0  0  
Severance pay 2 0  -1 5  -57  
Other labour income 37 6  0 19  1  
Other income 3 0  -5 4  -188  
Pension 53 8  -15 13  -28  
Unemployment income 20 3  0 7  0  
Child-related transfers 6 1  1 5   
Other personal public 
transfers 4 1  1 7  38  
Taxes and contributions 157 24  6 18  4  
Total personal income (gross) 647 100  42 40  6  
Total personal income (net) 490 76 36 27  7 
Notes: The values calculated in t=1 are simple averages for men between 40 and the 
retirement age, working at the time and living with a partner, and for the households they 
live in. Changes are the regression estimate of the indicator variable of ‘inactive as a result of 
loss of job in t=2 and t=3’, where on the right there is the change in the income or 
expenditure category concerned between the 1st and 3rd periods, while on the left, there is 
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the activity of the partner, the number of people in the household, the number of working 
people, the qualifications of the person concerned and his partner, or the range thereof, as 
well as the indicators of historic time.   
‘Std. error’ indicates the standard error of the estimate of the change, while the ‘S’ column 
shows the significance level at which the deviance can be regarded as different from zero. 
The asterisk (*) indicates a deviance that is significant at 5%, and the + sign, at 10%. 
Source: own calculations based on the relevant periods of the HBS pooled panel (see data 
description in Section 2).  
 
Table A2. Size and actual change in household income and expenditure, and in own and 
partner’s income, if an unemployed male living with a partner becomes inactive as of the 
2nd period of the panel, and the partner’s activity does not change (N=49) 
 Value in t=1 
Value 
in t=3 
Change 
(%) 
Weight 
in t=1 
(%) 
Weight 
in t=3 
(%) 
Household income      
Gross salary 193 194 1  31  33  
Severance pay 21 2 -92  3  0  
Agric. profit 26 5 -82  4  1  
Other labour income 30 16 -48  5  3  
From savings 0 2 314  0  0  
From own production 79 71 -11  13  12  
Other income 6 8 30  1  1  
Pension 107 236 120  17  40  
Unemployment transfer 113 13 -88  18  2  
Child-related transfer 31 32 3  5  5  
Other public transfer 17 9 -48  3  2  
Transfer from other household 6 9 59  1  2  
Transfer to other household 30 25 -17  5  4  
Taxes and contributions 62 53 -14  10  9  
Total income (gross) 630 597 -5  100  100  
Total income (net) 539 519 -4  85  87  
      
Household expenditure      
Food 233 206 -12  46  43  
Alcohol and tobacco 47 42 -12  9  9  
Self-produced consumption 79 71 -11  16  15  
Clothing 31 29 -7  6  6  
Home upkeep expenses 82 97 17  16  20  
Transport 51 40 -20  10  8  
Other 63 70 11  12  14  
Total expenditure 507 483 -5  100  100  
Extended total expenditure 561 524 -7    
Durable articles 17 13 -24    
      
Own income      
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Gross salary 23 5 -77  7  2  
Other income from full-time 
job 0 0  0  0  
Severance pay 31 0 -100  9  0  
Other labour income 5 0 -100  2  0  
Other income 0 0  0  0  
Pension 61 299 390  18  97  
Unemployment income 208 0 -100  61  0  
Child-related transfers 0 0  0  0  
Other personal public transfers 16 5 -71  5  2  
Taxes and contributions 22 1 -97  6  0  
Total personal income (gross) 344 309 -10  100  100  
Total personal income (net) 322 308 -4  94  100  
      
Partner’s income      
Gross salary 281 316 13  61  65  
Other income from full-time 
job 0 0  0  0  
Severance pay 0 5  0  1  
Other labour income 13 9 -32  3  2  
Other income 6 4 -34  1  1  
Pension 133 134 1  29  28  
Unemployment income 15 5 -67  3  1  
Child-related transfers 0 7  0  2  
Other personal public transfers 9 6 -33  2  1  
Taxes and contributions 66 83 26  14  17  
Total personal income (gross) 457 486 6  100  100  
Total personal income (net) 391 403 3  86  83  
Notes: Simple averages with constant economic activity of partner. 
Source: own calculations based on the relevant periods of the HBS pooled panel (see data 
description in Section 2).  
Table A2a: Size of household income and expenditure, and of own and partner’s income, as 
well as the changes therein estimated by excluding other effects, if an unemployed male 
living with a partner becomes inactive as of the 2nd period of the panel (N=196) 
 Value in t=1 Ratio (%) Change Std. error S. Change (%) 
Household income       
Gross salary 561 38  -38 89  -7  
Severance pay 20 1  3 20  15  
Agric. Profit 40 3  -15 51  -38  
Other labour income 73 5  -75 72  -103  
From savings 2 0  -2 3  -153  
From own production 184 13  -1 27  -1  
Other income 20 1  -29 22  -149  
Pension 128 9  172 43 * 135  
Unemployment transfer 244 17  -28 43  -12  
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Child-related transfer 135 9  48 24 * 35  
Other public transfer 21 1  -10 20  -47  
Transfer from other 
household 30 2  1 16  4  
Transfer to other household 36 2  -38 19 * -106  
Taxes and contributions 162 11  -14 34  -9  
Total income (gross) 1458 100  26 109  2  
Total income (net) 1260 86  78 97  6  
       
Household expenditures       
Food 503 43  -12 38  -2  
Alcohol and tobacco 98 8  8 13  8  
Self-produced consumption 184 16  -1 27  -1  
Clothing 85 7  10 20  12  
Home upkeep expenses 209 18  53 19 * 25  
Transport 97 8  2 22  2  
Other 183 16  50 44  28  
Total expenditure 1175 100  111 86  9  
Extended total expenditure 1319 112  101 131  8  
Durable articles 64 5  25 51  40  
       
Own income       
Gross salary 83 23  -106 62 + -128  
Other income from full-time 
job 0 0  0 0   
Severance pay 16 5  5 19  30  
Other labour income 33 9  -58 65  -178  
Other income 3 1  6 7  165  
Pension 15 4  143 24 * 948  
Unemployment income 200 56  -64 35 + -32  
Child-related transfers 0 0  0 0   
Other personal public 
transfers 6 2  -7 12  -114  
Taxes and contributions 39 11  -23 21  -61  
Total personal income 
(gross) 356 100  -82 75  -23  
Total personal income (net) 317 89  -58 63  -18  
       
Partner’s income       
Gross salary 350 69  69 44  20  
Other income from full-time 
job 0 0  -1 1  -274  
Severance pay 2 0  -2 6  -129  
Other labour income 24 5  -22 14  -93  
Other income 9 2  -44 19 * -478  
Pension 74 15  -5 22  -6  
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Unemployment income 36 7  18 15  50  
Child-related transfers 8 2  0 8   
Other personal public 
transfers 5 1  -6 9  -109  
Taxes and contributions 92 18  8 20  9  
Total personal income (gross) 508 100  8 46  1  
Total personal income (net) 415 82  -1 35  0  
Notes: The values calculated in t=1 are simple averages for men between 40 and the 
retirement age, unemployed at the time and living with a partner, and for the households 
they live in. Changes are the regression estimate of the indicator variable of ‘inactive as a 
result of loss of job in t=2 and t=3’, where on the right there is the change in the income or 
expenditure category concerned between the 1st and 3rd periods, while on the left, there is 
the activity of the partner, the number of people in the household, the number of working 
people, the qualification of the person concerned and his partner, or the range thereof, as 
well as the indicators of historic time. 
‘Std. error’ indicates the standard error of the estimate of the change, while the ‘S’ column 
shows the significance level at which the deviance can be regarded as different from zero. 
The asterisk (*) indicates a deviance that is significant at 5%, and the + sign, at 10%. 
Source: own calculations based on the relevant periods of the HBS pooled panel (see data 
description in Section 2). 
 
Table A3: Size and actual change in household income and expenditure, and of own and 
partner’s income, if a working female living with a partner becomes inactive as of the 
2nd period of the panel, and the partner’s activity does not change (N=32) 
 Value in t=1 Value in t=3 
Change 
(%) 
Weight in t=1 
(%) 
Weight 
in t=3 
(%) 
Household income      
Gross salary 542 301 -44  63  40  
Severance pay 0 4  0  1  
Agric. profit -16 -10 -42  -2  -1  
Other labour income 51 61 19  6  8  
From savings 4 4 -5  1  1  
From own production 76 82 8  9  11  
Other income 6 11 97  1  1  
Pension 154 284 85  18  37  
Unemployment transfer 19 4 -78  2  1  
Child-related transfer 18 9 -50  2  1  
Other public transfer 2 3 20  0  0  
Transfer from other 
household 11 6 -45  1  1  
Transfer to other 
household 25 32 27  3  4  
Taxes and contributions 164 111 -32  19  15  
Total income (gross) 867 759 -12  100  100  
Total income (net) 678 616 -9  78  81  
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 Value in t=1 Value in t=3 
Change 
(%) 
Weight in t=1 
(%) 
Weight 
in t=3 
(%) 
Own income      
Gross salary 421 50 -88  75  14  
Other income from full-
time job 0 0  0  0  
Severance pay 0 0  0  0  
Other labour income 55 5 -91  10  1  
Other income 0 0  0  0  
Pension 64 296 361  11  83  
Unemployment income 20 0 -100  4  0  
Child-related transfers 0 3  0  1  
Other personal public 
transfers 0 1  0  0  
Taxes and contributions 117 14 -88  21  4  
Total personal income 
(gross) 560 355 -37  100  100  
Total personal income 
(net) 442 340 -23  79  96  
      
Partner’s income      
Gross salary 533 431 -19  66  54  
Other income from full-
time job 0 0  0  0  
Severance pay 0 7  0  1  
Other labour income 62 118 90  8  15  
Other income 0 1  0  0  
Pension 214 232 8  26  29  
Unemployment income 0 5  0  1  
Child-related transfers 0 0  0  0  
Other personal public 
transfers 0 0 24  0  0  
Taxes and contributions 181 174 -4  22  22  
Total personal income 
(gross) 809 795 -2  100  100  
Total personal income 
(net) 628 620 -1  78  78  
Notes: Simple averages with constant economic activity of partner. 
Source: own calculations based on the relevant periods of the HBS pooled panel (see data 
description in Section 2).  
Table A3a: Size of household income and expenditure, and of own and partner’s income, as 
well as the changes therein estimated by excluding other effects, if a working female 
living with a partner becomes inactive as of the 2nd period of the panel (N=720) 
 46
 Value in t=1 Ratio (%) Change 
Std. 
error S. 
Change 
(%) 
Household income       
Gross salary 1688 69  -226 127 + -13  
Severance pay 7 0  11 15  163  
Agric. profit 34 1  33 47  99  
Other labour income 159 7  85 66  53  
From savings 15 1  32 31  212  
From own production 186 8  45 31  24  
Other income 25 1  -20 17  -81  
Pension 168 7  154 35 * 92  
Unemployment transfer 33 1  -36 17 * -110  
Child-related transfer 83 3  -23 28  -28  
Other public transfer 15 1  0 10  2  
Transfer from other 
household 22 1  -5 9  -22  
Transfer to other household 64 3  16 25  26  
Taxes and contributions 544 22  -45 55  -8  
Total income (gross) 2434 100  48 141  2  
Total income (net) 1826 75  77 114  4  
       
Household expenditure       
Food 578 36  29 49  5  
Alcohol and tobacco 103 6  -9 19  -9  
Self-produced consumption 186 12  45 31  24  
Clothing 131 8  -10 22  -8  
Home upkeep expenses 252 16  12 21  5  
Transport 196 12  -12 31  -6  
Other 333 21  39 46  12  
Total expenditure 1593 100  48 107  3  
Extended total expenditure 1797 113  -12 154  -1  
Durable articles 118 7  -77 82  -66  
       
Own income       
Gross salary 776 92  -265 65 * -34  
Other income from full-time 
job 0 0  0 1  130  
Severance pay 3 0  -1 10  -29  
Other labour income 50 6  -7 30  -15  
Other income 6 1  -31 10 * -477  
Pension 6 1  181 17 * 3072  
Unemployment income 4 0  -27 7 * -737  
Child-related transfers 0 0  5 2 *  
Other personal public 
transfers 1 0  1 3  55  
Taxes and contributions 233 27  -87 27 * -37  
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Total personal income (gross) 847 100  -145 58 * -17  
Total personal income (net) 614 73  -58 37  -9  
       
Partner’s income       
Gross salary 707 75  16 85  2  
Other income from full-time 
job 0 0  0 1  0  
Severance pay 4 0  11 11  302  
Other labour income 89 9  41 53  46  
Other income 3 0  0 6  -4  
Pension 120 13  -32 25  -27  
Unemployment income 20 2  11 10  59  
Child-related transfers 0 0  0 0   
Other personal public 
transfers 2 0  -2 5  -124  
Taxes and contributions 257 27  22 39  9  
Total personal income (gross) 945 100  46 77  5  
Total personal income (net) 688 73  24 49  3  
Notes: The values calculated in t=1 are simple averages for women between 40 and the 
retirement age, working at the time and living with a partner, and for the households they 
live in. Changes are the regression estimate of the indicator variable of ‘inactive as a result of 
loss of job in t=2 and t=3’, where on the right there is the change in the income or 
expenditure category concerned between the 1st and 3rd periods, while on the left, there is 
the activity of the partner, the number of people in the household, the number of working 
people, the qualification of the person concerned and her partner, or the range thereof, as 
well as the indicators of historic time. 
‘Std. error’ indicates the standard error of the estimate of the change, while the ‘S’ column 
shows the significance level at which the deviance can be regarded as different from zero. 
The asterisk (*) indicates a deviance that is significant at 5%, and the + sign, at 10%. 
Source: own calculations based on the relevant periods of the HBS pooled panel (see data 
description in Section 2).  
Table A4. Size and actual change in household income and expenditure, and of own and 
partner’s income, if an unemployed female living with a partner becomes inactive as of 
the 2nd period of the panel (N=27) 
 
Value in 
t=1 
Value in 
t=3 
Change 
(%) 
Weight 
in t=1 
(%) 
Weight in 
t=3 (%) 
Household income      
Gross salary 345 268 -22  43  37  
Severance pay 6 0 -100  1  0  
Agric. profit 10 18 85  1  3  
Other labour income 68 67 -2  8  9  
From savings 1 1 -24  0  0  
From own production 89 91 3  11  12  
Other income 8 5 -40  1  1  
Pension 126 224 78  16  31  
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Unemployment transfer 117 24 -80  15  3  
Child-related transfer 19 16 -17  2  2  
Other public transfer 5 5 -4  1  1  
Transfer from other household 12 14 17  1  2  
Transfer to other household 29 23 -23  4  3  
Taxes and contributions 128 99 -23  16  14  
Total income (gross) 806 731 -9  100  100  
Total income (net) 648 609 -6  80  83  
      
Household expenditure      
Food 250 241 -4  42  44  
Alcohol and tobacco 47 40 -15  8  7  
Self-produced consumption 89 91 3  15  17  
Clothing 47 19 -60  8  3  
Home upkeep expenses 95 114 20  16  21  
Transport 55 34 -38  9  6  
Other 107 102 -5  18  19  
Total expenditure 603 551 -9  100  100  
Extended total expenditure 642 578 -10    
Durable articles 18 11 -35    
      
Own income      
Gross salary 34 6 -81  12  3  
Other income from full-time 
job 0 0  0  0  
Severance pay 5 0 -100  2  0  
Other labour income 1 1 -6  0  1  
Other income 0 1  0  0  
Pension 29 208 613  11  94  
Unemployment income 204 0 -100  74  0  
Child-related transfers 3 0 -100  1  0  
Other personal public 
transfers 0 5  0  2  
Taxes and contributions 18 1 -96  7  0  
Total personal income (gross) 275 221 -20  100  100  
Total personal income (net) 257 221 -14  93  100  
      
Partner’s income      
Gross salary 414 384 -7  52  51  
Other income from full-time 
job 0 0  0  0  
Severance pay 0 0  0  0  
Other labour income 134 142 6  17  19  
Other income 9 4 -59  1  1  
Pension 223 197 -11  28  26  
Unemployment income 14 32 134  2  4  
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Child-related transfers 0 0  0  0  
Other personal public 
transfers 1 0 -100  0  0  
Taxes and contributions 171 158 -8  22  21  
Total personal income (gross) 794 759 -4  100  100  
Total personal income (net) 623 601 -3  78  79  
Notes: Simple averages with constant economic activity of partner. 
Source: own calculations based on the relevant periods of the HBS pooled panel (see data 
description in Section 2).  
Table A4a. Size of household income and expenditure, and of own and partner’s income, as 
well as the changes therein estimated by excluding other effects, if an unemployed female 
living with a partner becomes inactive as of the 2nd period of the panel (N=96) 
 Value in t=1 Ratio (%) Change Std. error S. Change (%) 
Household income       
Gross salary 660 41  -146 167  -22  
Severance pay 6 0  -15 8 * -263  
Agric. profit 25 2  -15 77  -61  
Other labour income 169 10  -12 124  -7  
From savings 3 0  8 6  293  
From own production 185 11  30 41  16  
Other income 31 2  -10 41  -31  
Pension 139 9  65 53  47  
Unemployment transfer 272 17  -52 51  -19  
Child-related transfer 86 5  25 23  29  
Other public transfer 25 2  20 24  81  
Transfer from other 
household 22 1  7 11  33  
Transfer to other household 43 3  -40 18 * -93  
Taxes and contributions 240 15  -18 59  -7  
Total income (gross) 1621 100  -95 199  -6  
Total income (net) 1338 83  -37 160  -3  
       
Household expenditure       
Food 521 41  29 46  5  
Alcohol and tobacco 102 8  19 18  19  
Self-produced consumption 185 15  30 41  16  
Clothing 98 8  -39 23 + -40  
Home upkeep expenses 214 17  38 29  18  
Transport 121 10  -1 31  -1  
Other 202 16  -26 41  -13  
Total expenditure 1259 100  19 85  2  
Extended total expenditure 1341 107  0 103  0  
Durable articles 29 2  -23 23  -78  
       
Own income       
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Gross salary 53 17  -81 67  -153  
Other income from full-time 
job 0 0  0 0   
Severance pay 3 1  -5 5  -158  
Other labour income 16 5  -9 13  -60  
Other income 24 7  5 36  22  
Pension 8 3  75 25 * 916  
Unemployment income 204 64  -57 37  -28  
Child-related transfers 1 0  -4 2 *  
Other personal public 
transfers 9 3  12 13  134  
Taxes and contributions 25 8  -29 22  -114  
Total personal income (gross) 318 100  -64 81  -20  
Total personal income (net) 292 92  -35 65  -12  
       
Partner’s income       
Gross salary 426 59  85 95  20  
Other income from full-time 
job 0 0  0 0   
Severance pay 0 0  0 0   
Other labour income 129 18  -14 115  -11  
Other income 3 0  -9 8  -337  
Pension 101 14  -45 39  -44  
Unemployment income 56 8  24 27  43  
Child-related transfers 0 0  0 0   
Other personal public 
transfers 5 1  0 13  -9  
Taxes and contributions 162 23  35 37  21  
Total personal income (gross) 718 100  41 117  6  
Total personal income (net) 557 77  7 100  1  
Notes: The values calculated in t=1 are simple averages for women between 40 and the 
retirement age, unemployed at the time and living with a partner, and for the households 
they live in. Changes are the regression estimate of the indicator variable of ‘inactive as a 
result of loss of job in t=2 and t=3’, where on the right there is the change in the income or 
expenditure category concerned between the 1st and 3rd periods, while on the left, there is 
the activity of the partner, the number of people in the household, the number of working 
people, the qualification of the person concerned and her partner, or the range thereof, as 
well as the indicators of historic time. 
‘Std. error’ indicates the standard error of the estimate of the change, while the ‘S’ column 
shows the significance level at which the deviance can be regarded as different from zero. 
The asterisk (*) indicates a deviance that is significant at 5%, and the + sign, at 10%. 
Source: own calculations based on the relevant periods of the HBS pooled panel (see data 
description in Section 2). 
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Annex B: Estimation of the probability of pensioner status from 
cross-sectional data 
‘Probability’ of pensioner status among men and women above 40 but at least 2 years before 
retirement age, living with a partner – probit estimate, marginal effect in the average of 
variables in the sample; estimate from the middle waves of the pooled HBS panel  
 
Specialised qualification -0.107** 
 (0.039) 
Secondary qualification -0.134** 
 (0.030) 
Tertiary qualification -0.173** 
 (0.026) 
Age  
49 0.121** 
 (0.040) 
50 0.195** 
 (0.040) 
51 0.160** 
 (0.047) 
52 0.287** 
 (0.046) 
53 0.313** 
 (0.042) 
54 0.263** 
 (0.060) 
55 0.347** 
 (0.053) 
56 0.397** 
 (0.072) 
57 0.449** 
 (0.058) 
58 0.558** 
 (0.048) 
Female 0.042* 
 (0.018) 
Aid in own right -0.121** 
 (0.029) 
Partic. rate (micro-region) -0.905** 
 (0.130) 
1994 0.016 
 (0.020) 
1997 0.067** 
 (0.023) 
Partner active -0.077** 
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 (0.022) 
County town -0.080** 
 (0.019) 
Other urban -0.091** 
 (0.016) 
Village -0.051** 
 (0.017) 
N 2729 
Average of dependent variable 0.26 
Log-likelihood -1272 
Pseudo-R2 0.18 
Notes: The reference group is that of males living in Budapest, who have not completed 
elementary education, receive no aid in their own right, included in the 1999–2000 panel, 
whose partner is inactive. 
In parentheses, the asymptotic standard errors robust for the correlation within the micro-
regions. 
+ significant difference from 0 at 10–5% level; * significant difference from 0 at 5–1% level; ** 
significant difference from 0 at least at 1% level.  
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